The war began on October 6th, 1973. The battles ended around October 27th, 1973.

What happened during that span, and how did the war really end?

Was the October War a partial victory, a partial defeat, a bit of both, or was it something else?

I know that this line of questioning may swell the ire of many -simply raising the issue may anger some- because it challenges some concepts that have been prevalent for decades. Bringing up the subject may cause a kind of distemper that some may find no justification for. It could threaten to put a sombre note on the hype and celebrations that occur this time every year. This is especially true since some people propagate information which is incomplete at times and misleading at others, like their talk of the air strike that shook the enemy to the core and gave us an easy victory.

No two people will disagree over the fact that the “Battle of the (Suez Canal) Crossing”, the destruction of the Bar Lev Line, and retrieving the eastern bank of the Suez Canal -the first phase of the war- was a great and legendary victory. But what happened after that?

Was that all?

Then why, if that’s the case, were we satisfied with the dishonourable peace agreement based on the Camp David accord? The agreement  gave Sinai back to us deprived in sovereignty and (mostly) stripped of our armed presence. It forced us to abandon most of our agreements and treaties with other Arab nations, and to resign Egypt’s role amongst Arab countries. It belittled us and forced us to run with our tails between our legs like mangy mutts. And because of the accord Egypt lost its significant role in leading the Arabs, a role it has not regained despite all that has happened from the time of the accord until now. Why did we take it?

When it comes to this subject, people are divided into camps, I believe.

In the first are those are unaware of the details of the war because they did not live it, and circumstances have not granted them the chance to study its details seriously and from neutral sources.

The second camp is comprised of those who lived through the events or have studied it seriously, deeply. They know well how the war evolved after the crossing and the destruction of the Bar Lev Line. They know of the fiasco then dubbed “Developing the Attack Eastward”, and how it created a gap in the lines allowing enemy forces to penetrate and cross to the canal’s western bank. They know the deterioration of the Egyptian situation that followed, lasting until the ceasefire that occurred in the last week of October. This camp is further broken into two sub-groups:

Those in the first group understand the “fragility” of the situation our forces were in during the end of those battles, yet are too embarrassed to breach the subject from this perspective, saving themselves from the celebrating mob, who may not hesitate to tear them apart for daring to oppose the mainstream and straying from the pack. Some who belong to this group may believe -naively or with good intention- that uncovering the facts could stand in opposition to national constants: A common flavor of nonsense.

The second group found self-interest in leaving things as they are: People long removed from the war (most  had not come into existence yet), continuing to believe information that is either false or surrounded by a thick fog that veils the eyes and obscures the facts.

I stress again that the Battle of the Crossing was epic and masterful by any and all standards.

I also stress that its enactment to such success carried with it many important implications:

• Egyptians’ talent for military planning that is tight, extraordinarily well thought out, and in which manifested an ability to create and innovate at a level worthy of all pride and self-respect.
• The ability to undertake a huge operation with a near-perfect degree of discipline, control and harmony.
• The rise of heroes at all levels: Leaders dieing on crossing bridges amongst their men, officers and soldiers offering their lives generously everywhere for a handful of their nation’s dirt and to avenge their fathers and brothers.

Real heroism, and I believe that what we know of these heroes is just the tip of the iceberg.

Then how did things end the way they did?

I’m sure that our generation -young at the time, and many of which were soldiers in the armed forces and on the field of battle- remembers the progression of events.

I find myself in need of giving a simple introduction that may help us understand what happened and to put it in the right context.

The Egyptian strategy of that phase was built -and it was due to that strategy that initial victory was achieved in the October battles- on the fact that our air force was not on par with that of the Israelis.

The latter enjoyed decisively superior capabilities as far as pilots and plane models. So Egyptian military strategy was built on the idea of neutralizing the Israeli air force using surface-to-air missiles (SAM). This would equalize the battle on the ground and level the playing field.

The strategy saw a huge success in eliminating the Israeli air advantage during the Battle of the Crossing. Thanks to the network of SAM missiles our forces had the cover they needed. They were able to face their enemy using armored ground units and infantry, defeating their Israeli counterparts and inflicting great losses. Our forces were able to completely retrieve the eastern bank of the Suez Canal after a series of brilliant battles that lasted from October 6th to the 13th.

A week after the battles began (on October 14th), under a decree that was named “Developing the Attack Eastward”, Egyptian forces left their defensive positions, under the cover of the SAM missiles, and headed west in the direction of the mountain passes in the middle of Sinai, with the goal of attacking and capturing the area.

And without getting into military details that may be outside the scope of this article, there is no doubt that the decree was catastrophic and had dangerous consequences. (The best resource for this subject is Lieutenant General Shazly’s memoirs about the October War). Here it is natural to ask how that dangerous decision -the main reason for turning the tide of battle against Egypt- was made.

Lieutenant General Shazly tells us how he, along with the commanders of the second and third field armies, tried to explain to Marshall Ahmad Ismail the danger of an eastward attack without air cover. Ismail was acting on President Sadat’s request. Shazly further tells how the military leadership refused to bear the responsibility of the rancid attack plan that the political leadership insisted on, and that the military leadership tried to persuade against to no avail.

“That decision was the first big mistake that the Egyptian leadership made during the war, and that mistake dragged us into a chain of other mistakes…” Lieutenant General Shazly in his memoirs.

In a few hours our forces lost 250 tanks and incurred a large number of casualties to its personell. More importantly, we lost our momentum and the morale of our forces was affected: The same morale that was sky high during the first days of battle. The confidence of the soldiers in their leadership was shaken.

Because of the direct intervention of President Sadat and his dependence on a controversial figure for the position of Minister of Defence -that of Marshall Ahmad Ismail, who apparently saw that fulfilling Sadat’s requests had priority over sound military thinking- the battle did not end in our favor.

One wonders how to interpret Sadat’s insistence on that faulty decision despite the advice of professional leaders on the importance of going back on it. It is not enough to justify the catastrophic decision with what transpired at the time: That it was taken with the goal of lightening some of the load on the Syrian front, which was suffering from a fierce Israeli attack at the time. From what we know of Sadat’s principals and the nature of his relationships with nations and individuals, there is no doubt that he was not the kind of man that gave a decree of that kind with magnanimous motive. This is especially true since Lieutenant General Shazly had clarified to Sadat, through Marshal Ismail, that the attack would not affect the northern front’s situation or help Syria. Or perhaps it was that Marshal Ismail -who President Nasser had fired during the War of Attrition due to reasons relating to incompetence, and who Sadat returned to service, hiring him as Directory of Military Intelligence and then as Minister of Defence- did not effectively deliver the warning to Sadat, which allowed Sadat to commit the deadly mistake.

My own interpretation of the matter is that Sadat was drunk off the ecstasy of the swift victory that occurred in the first days of the war. He was not aware enough of the dangers that were a consequence of his decision, and perhaps he imagined that all he had to do was “give his orders” and the forces would move and what he desired would be.

Things then progress quickly from bad to worse.

Israelis are quick to exploit the situation to their advantage, and they build on their victory, exploiting information that reached them from American scout planes. The planes revealed that Egyptian forces were completely naked on the west bank after pushing two armored divisions  (4 and 21) in the failed offensive operation of October 14th.

The Israelis succeed in pushing their forces (amphibious tanks), in small numbers, to the western bank of the canal and the Deversoir area. The forces move between the locations of the second and third armies, causing a confusion to pave the way for the operation to breach the gap in the lines.

And as Sadat wears his bright military suit to give his victory speach -well before its time- to the People’s Assembly, international news agencies are broadcasting the image of Golda Meir speaking to the world from a location on the western bank of the Suez Canal!

The Israeli forces cross to the western bank of the canal with the leadership of Ariel Sharon. They began attacking and destroying the missile bases in order to open a window for the superior Israeli air force. They went on to attack the rear of our forces and disrupting them.

Shazly’s assessment was correct when he warned of the dangers of the operation, after previewing the situation from the ground.

Shazly made a request to pull forces from the eastern bank to the western one to face the Israeli forces that had crept there. The Israelis were multiplying rapidly in the west, since there was a huge deficit in our forces there (nearly none) after most were pushed to the eastern bank during the Battle of the Crossing and the battle of Developing the Attack on October 14th.

Lieutenant General Shazly stressed that the forces that were requested for pull-out would not have weakened our forces on the eastern bank, which we had crossed to and were concentrated in. This was especially true since two armored divisions were pushed eastward in the failed progression operation (armored divisions 4 and 21) and did not return back to their western positions, as mentioned earlier.

It is certain that the Israeli forces that started and succeeded in crossing to the canal’s western bank were at first quite limited and frail. Isreali leadership did not count on them much, and Moshe Dayan -Isreali Minister of Defense- opposed the idea in the beginning, considering it a risk that could end in catastrophe for the Isrealis  [Group of Israeli Journalists, The Shortcoming].

The evaluation of Lieutenant General Shazly, Chief of Staff, was that the force could be eliminated if the necessary resources were provided. If only Ahmad Ismail and Sadat did not oppose him.

And here, for the second time, we find ourselves in a very perplexing situation.

Sadat and Ahmad Ismail insist on the unacceptability of moving forces east to west. They claim that this would have a negative effect on the morale of the forces, forces who had tasted victory and were not about to retreat!

Shazly, a military veteran and professional, tried to explain to the President that there was a big difference between “retreat” and “manoeuvring”. This caused Sadat to erupt, threatening Shazly with maximum punishment and military court if the latter repeated his request: To pull soldiers eastward, helping mitigate the risk of the growing gap within the western lines.

Tragedy ensued.

Accepting Sadat and Ahmad Ismail’s theory, not built on sound evaluation of the facts, Egyptian attempts to close the gap using eastern bank forces continued. The forces, with no air cover, were unable to close the gap under the shadow of complete air dominance by the enemy.

Sharon’s forces, succeeding in building a bridge (on the night of October 17th/18th) and crossing to our western bank, multiplied quickly. They were able to advance south in the direction of Suez, destroying missile bases that had been rocks in our ocean sinking the Israeli air ships.

And as is known, Sadat was adverse to revising his mistakes and giving a chance to the professional military leaders to recover from the consequences of the very strange decision that he took based on the advice of his Minister of Defense. Or perhaps he had reached these decisions by himself, without any military credentials helping him. (Despite Sadat being a military officer, he was a small rank when he left the military in 1952. And in any case he was an officer in the Signal Corps, which did not qualify him at all for leading a single troop, let alone an army as modern or as large as the Egyptian army in 1973).
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“And when we pushed our air forces to intercept the enemy’s planes on the 20th of October, in the battle zone west of the canal, the enemy dropped 19 of our planes in one battle…!” (Shazly’s memoirs).

“In addition to crushing air superiority, the enemy was superior (on the west bank) in armored forces with a ratio of more than 2:1…” (Shazly’s memoirs)

The tragedy further unfolds when the successful Israeli surge continues southward, reaching the Adabiya port south of the city of Suez. There the Israeli forces encircle the third army residing on the eastern bank of the canal, surrounding it completely and cutting off supplies to both it and the city of Suez.

Before our last scene we see 45,000 of our armed forces, the main foundation of the third army, completely surrounded. We see ourselves unable to supply our forces with food, water or otherwise, other than what Israel allowed, and there she exacted the greatest degree of extortion.

That’s how a large Egyptian city, Suez, became completely surrounded, with no supplies reaching it.

Israel and America asked for their heart’s desire in return for keeping the surrounded army alive, and they were given all they asked.

The supply caravans were not allowed to pass to our surrounded forces before going through humiliating Israeli inspections. Egyptian drivers were forbidden to drive the caravans. Covers and winter clothes were disallowed entry, even with the then coming winter season.

The last scene of the October War was at the 101st kilometer (Cairo-Suez highway), where the talks that led to the first disengagement agreement, on January 18th 1974, were held.

And it seems from the unfolding sequence of events that there were no talks or negotiations in the way commonly understood. It was more a matter of the victor laying down his terms to the defeated, assured of their acceptance.

As a consequence of those agreements, most of our forces that had crossed the canal retreated to the west bank. This was in exchange for Israel releasing our surrounded third army, returning them safely after an entrapment that lasted close to three months.

And with that Sadat -who had adamantly refused to pull back a single soldier from those who had crossed the canal, and had went so far as to sequester his Chief of Staff (and it was thanks mainly to that same commander more than any other man that we achieved what we did during the Battle of the Crossing on October ‘73) because of the latter’s desire to pull the necessary forces to stop the enemy, who was penetrating our naked locations on that bank- Sadat himself did not hesitate to pull most of those forces back (other than a symbolic force) in the first “disengagement” agreement held after the battles ended!

The third army, surrounded earlier, retreated. So did the entirety of the second army retreated save 7000 soldiers and 30 tanks. All returned to the west bank after the first disengagement agreement.

Shazly says in a most grievous tone, “..how dear the price that Egypt paid as a result of the besieging around the third army from the 23rd of October (and until the 18th of January 1974).

The surround on the third army undid all the glorious victories of October.

And it undid oil as a weapon.

And it undid the effective naval blockade (the passage leading to Israel from the southern Red Sea at the Bab-el-Mandab strait).

And it cost the Egyptian political leadership its ability to move and manoeuvre, and it made [the leadership] a puppet in the hand of Israel and America.”

The political losses were quite heavy as well, and it’s no secret. Soon Sadat announced a new doctrine for the struggle with Israel, announcing  that the United States owned 99% of the cards: The series of concessions began.

I was an army recruit at the time, and I still remember how our morale was at the end of that war: It was terrible.

We did not understand at the time why we didn’t achieve the victory we aspired for, and why we didn’t finish the war the way we started it.

We were told that Israel received aid that strengthened its position. Sure, a large amount of supplies did reach Israel. But we also knew that the Soviet Union was not stingy in providing the supplies that we needed at that stage of battle.

It was not a sufficient or convincing reason.

And it was rumoured that the gap in the lines occurred in an area that was overseen by Kuwaiti forces, forces unqualified for real battle!

God only knows who was responsible for spreading those bizarre rumours.

The result was saddening, in any case.

Truly, we achieved a great victory when we applied ourselves, moved with discipline, and kept to a tight plan built on logical foundations and scientific study. Success was then brilliant, the win great, and the results better than anticipated.

We achieved victory and superiority when the leadership that moved our forces and controlled the operations was aware, competent, wise, armed with knowledge and experience.

So when he with no knowledge, experience or competence intervened, he ended up losing everything, ruining everything. He squandered what our heroes had achieved with their blood, sweat and sacrifice. We were left with the tragic situation that we expounded earlier.

I feel saddened, pained, every year when the people hold their celebrations; and we see the posers and the jokers forging the facts and draping the cloths of heroism on the deserving and undeserving. Meanwhile the real hero is veiled from sight, and his story is almost lost to our sons of the new generation who did not live to see the events.

As God is my witness, we in the armed forces did not have a day pass that we did not hear Shazly’s name, for one reason or another, prior to the October War. Training exercises…manoeuvring…experimenting with new weapons…directing the highest military commanders and the lowest ranking soldiers…development of systems and traditions that had stayed undeveloped for years earlier…even military uniforms were enlivened with great ideas and improvements by Shazly…

Lieutenant General Saad Shazly breathed new life into every soldier in the armed forces, and I have never met a person who knew him closely and didn’t endow him with the noblest of attributes.

Perhaps many do not know that Saad el Din Shazly was a true hero of the 1967 war!

In ‘67, Shazly remained with his troops. He didn’t run back home in fear as did most of the other military leaders. He succeeded in achieving the best orderly retreat that circumstances allowed for: Under the pressure of enemy air strikes and the enemy’s complete control of the battlefield, under a collapsed leadership…under very difficult and complicated circumstances.

His unit was the last of the Egyptian army to retreat from Sinai and cross to the west bank. This after a story of heroism that is worthy of telling and worthy of history to remember.

That was the first time I remember hearing the name of that great man.

How I wish that the day would come that sees the rewriting of October War’s history, when everyone gets their rightful recognition: Thanks to who deserve it, and the tugging of heros’ halos down  off the heads of the undeserving.

“And never think that those who rejoice in what they have perpetrated and like to be praised for what they did not do – never think them to be in safety from the punishment, and for them is a painful punishment. And to [God] belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth, and [God] is over all things competent.”
– Qur’an (3:188) (Translation from http://quran.com/3, orignal edits in italic, translator’s edits [in square braces])